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1 JUL 1977

See Int #11

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Security Reinvestigation Program

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1. Action Requested: None; for information only.

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2. Background: Reference is made to your memorandum of 1 June 1977 which relates to the Office of Security Reinvestigation Program of 1976, when we processed reinvestigation cases and developed noteworthy information in cases. A question was raised as to what action was ultimately taken in those reinvestigation cases.

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3. A current review of our security files on these Agency employees reflects the following breakdown of the cases, which have been summarized in the attachments:

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Tab A Drug Related Problems

B Contact with Foreign
Nationals

C Unauthorized Disclosure of
Classified Information

D Marital Problems

E Morals

F Alcohol Problems

G Financial Problems

H Homosexual Activity

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- I. Personality Problems
- J Violation of Agency Regulations
- K Illegal Use of Government Property
- L Unauthorized Record Keeping
- M Shoplifting
- N Miscellaneous

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4. [] It is to be noted that the current review of these files was somewhat detailed and the summaries accurately reflect the nature of the basic problem, as well as the final disposition of the cases. There is obviously some risk in categorizing the cases in absolute terms because the difficulties sometimes overlap, as in the areas of marital, alcohol, financial, and personality problems. One case might have all these ingredients.

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5. [] Quite aside from the formal aspects of the Reinvestigation Program, the Office of Security is occasionally provided with leads, suspicions, or charges relating to the security reliability of Agency officers. As a standard practice these leads are followed by special inquiries as appropriate, depending upon the nature and seriousness of the allegations. During calendar year 1976 the Office of Security was instrumental in arranging for the involuntary

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6. [] With respect to an assessment of our current system of identifying problem security cases, I believe that the Security Review Task Force quite properly focused on that issue in its analysis of the [] case, particularly in terms of personnel security lessons (pages 25 to 75). The points were correctly made on pages 74-75 that:

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a. It must be recognized that there is an extremely close interrelationship between security and suitability issues.

b. First-line supervisors are in the best position to know about developing problem situations, and they must accept action responsibility in alerting appropriate Agency elements when there are security implications in the case.

c. A vigorous repolygraph program offers the best chance of uncovering an individual who is deliberately violating the security trust placed in him by the Agency.

d. A more forceful hand needs to be taken in weeding out officers whose long-term track record clearly indicates that they are unsuited for Agency employment.

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7. ☐ In effect, our Reinvestigation Program serves as the formal mechanism in providing Agency officers with the opportunity to discuss actual or potential problem cases. However, this Reinvestigation Program is based essentially on the five-year cycle, and developing problem situations must be nipped in the bud before the matter gets out of hand. That is why there is so much responsibility placed on the first-line supervisor, who should step forth on his or her own initiative in an effort to provide help to the troubled employee.

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8. ☐ It is for the above reason that the Director of Personnel, the Director of Security, and other senior managers in the Agency have an obligation to inform the Agency population of their responsibilities relative to problem situations which have suitability, security, or psychiatric overtones. If we don't know about the problem it is impossible to take corrective action. The Task Force report highlighted the fact that operating elements of the Agency seldom refer cases to the Personnel Evaluation Board.

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9. ☐ The key point is that the Office of Security must rely to a considerable extent on the cooperation and support of Agency officers, who must assist us in this endeavor. If

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[REDACTED]

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Security presses unreasonably hard in a unilateral approach, it will smack of "Big Brother is watching" and the entire effort could prove to be counterproductive. Within the Agency we have always prided ourselves on the fact that security is a positive ongoing program which provides an overall environment conducive to helping our employees in problem situations.

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10. [REDACTED] A key function of the Office of Security is its role in assisting those employees who get into trouble. Upon occasion there will be individuals who have difficulties with local law enforcement bodies or have personal problems of one kind or another. A Security Duty Office staffed 24 hours a day and a staff of Security Officers ready to respond at any time fulfill this role in affording an immediate response capability for staff employees who need assistance. The whole program is designed not necessarily to punish an employee, but to establish a spirit of mutual trust and acceptance wherein an employee knows that he or she can come to the Office of Security and receive a helping hand and a sympathetic ear.

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11. [REDACTED] In substance, I feel that we do have a good ongoing personnel security program. There may be some fine tuning to improve the procedures, but the basic security policies strike me as being fundamentally sound.

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[REDACTED]

for Robert W. Gambino

Atts

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